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TAINTED FROM THEIR ROOTS: THE FUNDAMENTAL 
UNFAIRNESS OF DEPRIVING FOREIGN NATIONALS OF 
COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION COURT 
Jehanzeb Khan 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“This seems to us to be an obvious truth.”1 In Gideon v. Wainwright, 
Justice Hugo Black stated that people haled into court by virtue of a 
criminal charge who are too poor to afford a lawyer cannot be assured a 
fair trial unless counsel is provided to them.2 Importantly, this “obvious 
truth” exists as a right  afforded to criminal defendants under the Sixth 
Amendment of the Constitution.3 However, there is no similar 
Constitutional protection for individuals in immigration removal  
proceedings, including immigrants who are apprehended while 
attempting to enter the United States and individuals who are already in 
the United States and facing deportation.4 Although various federal 
statutes have provided for individuals in removal proceedings to secure 
counsel, only thirty-seven percent of all individuals in removal 
proceedings are actually able to do so.5 
While the consequences of an immigration proceeding are akin to those 
in a criminal proceeding, their rights are ostensibly limited because 
foreign nationals are not protected by the Sixth Amendment in removal 
proceedings. Specifically, while a criminal defendant need only 
demonstrate that their right to counsel was violated, certain circuits have 
found that foreign nationals must demonstrate that they were prejudiced 
by the lack of counsel—particularly, that the lack of counsel resulted in 
removal or deportation.6  
This Note evaluates the circuit split of whether or not pro se individuals 
who are subject to removal proceedings in immigration courts must 
separately demonstrate that the absence of counsel leads to prejudice. 
Section II provides detail about the right to counsel in criminal 
proceedings, how a Constitutional right provides greater protection than 
a right protected by a federal statute, and the history and background of 8 
 
 1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).  
 2. Id.  
 3. INGRID EAGLY & STEVEN SHAFER, ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION COURT, (American 
Immigration Counsel eds., 2016). 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. 
 6. These circuits conflate prejudice with the “harmless error doctrine.” Namely, that despite a 
legal error by a judge (like denying a foreign national of their statutory right to counsel), the foreign 
national would have be removed anyway, thus nullifying the need to appeal.  
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U.S.C. § 1362, a statute which provides respondents in removal 
proceedings a right to counsel. Section II also outlines the caselaw from 
circuits that have ruled on the circuit split and whether a foreign national 
needs to demonstrate how a lack of counsel in their immigration 
proceeding resulted in prejudice. Section III explains why federal courts 
should not require foreign nationals to demonstrate prejudice when they 
are denied their right to counsel in immigration proceedings. Finally, 
Section IV concludes with framing the current legal landscape and 
reaffirming why federal courts should not require foreign nationals to 
demonstrate prejudice. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Part A of this Section will begin with a history of immigration policies 
by the United States government beginning in the late 1700s and leading 
to the present day. Part A will also outline the American immigration 
court system and what current immigration proceedings in the United 
States look like. Finally, Part A will discuss what the right to counsel 
looks like for foreign nationals in immigration court, how it differs from 
the right to counsel provided to criminal defendants, and the ramifications 
of the distinction. Parts B and C will outline the circuit split at issue— 
whether a foreign national in immigration court must show prejudice to 
demonstrate that their right to counsel was violated.  
A. Immigration In America 
1. Immigration Policy Through the History of the United States 
The history of immigration in the United States begins near the 
conception of the United States as a nation. Citizenship in 1790 was a 
privilege limited to free white people of “good moral character” who had 
lived in the United States for at least two years.7  Beginning in 1875, 
numerous restrictions were placed on who could enter the United States, 
with the immigration system excluding criminals, people with contagious 
diseases, beggars, and eventually, immigrants from most Asian 
countries.8 Through the late 1800s and into the early 1900s, most 
immigrants coming into the United States were from northern and western 
Europe.9 Eventually, more immigrants began coming from southern and 
 
 7. D’Vera Cohn, How U.S. immigration laws and rules have changed through history, PEW RES. 
CENTER (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/09/30/how-u-s-immigration-
laws-and-rules-have-changed-through-history/. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. 
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eastern Europe. In response, in the 1920s the United States passed a series 
of laws imposing numerical quotas to favor northern and western 
European immigrants over southern and eastern Europeans.10 
By the mid-20th Century, these restrictions began to crumble, allowing 
for more visas for Asians and the eventual removal of race as a ground 
for exclusion altogether.11 In 1965, the Immigration and Nationality Act 
created a system favoring family reunification and skilled immigrants.12 
Eventually, immigration law began to focus on refugees, with a 1990 law 
creating the “temporary protective status” that shielded immigrants from 
deportation to countries facing armed conflicts, disasters, and other 
conditions.13 
In 1986, Congress enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(“IRCA”). The IRCA granted legal status to unauthorized immigrants 
who met certain conditions.14 However, subsequent laws going into the 
21st Century put an emphasis on border control and tighter admission 
eligibility requirements.15 Eventually, in 2012, President Barack Obama 
enacted the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) policy 
through executive action. This allowed young adults and children who 
had been brought to the country illegally to apply for a work permit and 
deportation relief.16 President Obama expanded the policy in 2014 to 
certain foreign national parents of U.S. born children. 
President Donald Trump, after being elected in 2016, introduced 
various policies curtailing the governance of immigration in the United 
States. In 2017, President Trump put in place a permanent travel 
restriction on all nationals from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, and 
North Korea, as well as officials from Venezuela.17 The order blocked 
most people from permanent residency in the United States and was 
upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Barr v. East Bay Sanctuary 
Covenant.18 
In 2017, President Trump lowered the admissions ceiling for the 
refugee admission program from 110,000 to 50,000.19 In 2018, the cap 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Priyanka Boghani, A Guide to Some Major Trump Administration Immigration Policies, 
FRONTLINE (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-guide-to-some-major-trump-
administration-immigration-policies/. This was the third version of the travel ban after two prior versions 
of the ban had been put on hold by various federal courts.  
 18. 140 U.S. 3 (2019).  
 19. Boghani, supra note 17. 
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was lowered to 45,000; and in 2019, the cap was again lowered to 
30,000.20 In 2020, President Trump further lowered the cap to 18,000, 
reportedly the lowest number of refugees settled in the United States in a 
single year since 1980.21 
Also in 2017, the Trump administration ended Temporary Protected 
Statuses (“TPS”) for many individuals in the United States.22 TPS is a 
form of relief that allows for foreign nationals to stay in the United States 
if they cannot return safely to their home countries due to extraordinary 
circumstances.23 Specifically, Trump ended TPS for foreign nationals 
from El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, and Sudan, putting 
at risk foreign nationals of those countries who had been living in the 
United States since as early as the 1990s.24 
In 2018, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced a “zero 
tolerance” policy that criminally prosecuted anyone who crossed the 
southern border into the United States illegally.25 The policy became 
known as the Trump administration’s “family separation policy,” 
separating foreign national children from their parents as they were put 
into the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”) while their parents were put in jail.26 In 2019, HHS identified at 
least 2,730 children that had been separated from their parents.27 As of 
October 21, 2020, there were at least 545 children who had not found their 
parents due to the family separation policy.28 
The Trump administration also changed many asylum policies, 
including implementing the Migrant Protection Protocols (“MPPs”) in 
2019, which required asylum seekers and other individuals looking to 
seek entry into the United States from the southern border to wait in 
Mexico (as opposed to the United States) until their day in court.29 In that 
same year, the Trump administration barred individuals attempting to 
seek asylum in the United States if they first crossed through another 
nation, effectively blocking all asylum seekers at the southern border 
 
          20. Id.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. See also Baker et. al, Jeff Sessions is Forced Out as Attorney General as Trump Installs 
Loyalist, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/us/politics/sessions-
resigns.html.  
 26. Boghani, supra note 17. 
 27. Id. The report of the HHS did note that that number was perhaps more due to an influx of 
children being separated in 2017. President Trump eventually ended family separation in June of 2018.  
 28. Armus & Sacchetti, The Parents of 545 children separated at the border still haven’t been 
found. The pandemic isn’t helping., WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 2020, 6:28 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/10/21/family-separation-parents-border-covid/.  
 29. Boghani, supra note 17. The MPP is currently facing legal challenges. 
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except those from Mexico.30   
As a candidate for President of the United States, Joe Biden affirmed 
that he planned to overturn many of the decisions made by the Trump 
administration, including eliminating the family separation policy, 
reinstating DACA, and reviewing TPS.31 After winning the 2020 
presidential election and taking office on January 20, 2021 President 
Biden issued a slew of executive orders pertaining to various immigration 
policies.32  
Some of the orders included revising civil immigration enforcement 
policies, ceasing construction on the southern border wall, preserving and 
fortifying DACA, requiring agencies to conduct a review on their policies 
that set up barriers to the legal immigration system, establishing a task 
force to reunite families that were separated under the Trump 
administration, implementing a comprehensive plan to allow orderly 
migration across the southern border, reviewing the MPPs, and enhancing 
refugee resettlement programs.33 As of the writing of this Note, it is too 
early to suggest what the impact of these new measures will be. 
2. Immigration Proceedings and Immigration Court 
Lawfully permanent foreign nationals, foreign nationals who have 
overstayed their visas, and foreign nationals who have been admitted into 
the United States through some other manner can be subjected to 
mandatory detention and a removal proceeding if they have committed 
two Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude (“CIMT”): an aggravated felony, 
a crime of domestic violence, a controlled substance offense, or a firearms 
offense.34 Once a foreign national is detained by Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) is served to 
the foreign national, explaining that they should be removed from the 
 
 30. Id.  
 31. The Biden Plan for Securing our Values as a Nation of Immigrants, BIDEN HARRIS, 
,https://joebiden.com/immigration/# (last visited Feb. 24, 2021).  
 32. Press Release, White House Briefing Room, FACT SHEET: President Biden Outlines Steps 
to Reform our Immigration System by Keeping Families Together, Addressing the Root Causes of 
Irregular Migration, and Streamlining the Legal Immigration System (Feb. 2, 2021), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/02/02/fact-sheet-president-biden-
outlines-steps-to-reform-our-immigration-system-by-keeping-families-together-addressing-the-root-
causes-of-irregular-migration-and-streamlining-the-legal-immigration-syst/.   
 33. Featured Issue: First 100 Days of the Biden Administration, AM. IMMIGR. LAW. ASS’N (Feb. 
24, 2021), https://www.aila.org/advo-media/issues/all/first-100-days.  
 34. BRYAN LONEGAN, IMMIGRATION LAW UNIT OF THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION AND REMOVAL:  A GUIDE FOR DETAINEES AND THEIR FAMILIES, (Feb. 2006), available at 
https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/detentionremovalguide_2006-02.pdf. There are also 
various grounds for deportability mentioned in § 237 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. CIMTs 
usually include murder, manslaughter, rape, kidnapping, etc.  
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United States.35 Depending on the nature of the crime and the foreign 
national’s immigration status and criminal record, they may be eligible 
for bond. If they are not eligible for bond, or cannot afford bond, foreign 
nationals are left to prepare for their removal proceeding from the 
confines of an immigration detention center holding unit.36  
On the NTA, the foreign national will be given their first court date 
called the Master Calendar Hearing (“MCH”).37 An immigration judge 
will usually have many cases as a part of their master calendar day, so 
each hearing is relatively short. Each hearing is designed for the 
immigration judge to take the pleadings, identify whether the foreign 
national is eligible for any type of relief, and, ultimately, determine if they 
can be subjected to removal. 38  
At the MCH, foreign nationals who appear by themselves are supposed 
to be told that they have the right to seek an attorney at their own cost, 
and are supposed to be given a continuance to seek an attorney if they so 
choose.39 In theory, the immigration judge should then provide foreign 
nationals with a list of resources, and a means to contact organizations 
that could provide an attorney at little to no cost.40 If a continuance is 
granted, a foreign national can then attempt to secure an attorney at their 
own expense. Some foreign nationals are held in ICE detention while they 
attempt to find an attorney.41 Even if a foreign national is unable to find 
an attorney for their removal hearing, or they decide to proceed without 
one, the immigration judge can still decide to proceed with the hearing.42 
3. The Right to Counsel 
Gideon v. Wainwright, a landmark United States Supreme Court case, 
affirmed that the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution requires 
defendants in criminal cases to be provided an attorney by the government 
if they are unable to afford one on their own.43 To reinforce this position, 
Justice Black noted that all levels of government are well-funded and 
well-established to try those who are accused.44 Further, Justice Black 
highlighted that individuals who are tried with crimes rarely can hire top 
 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. 
 37. Immigration Equality, Immigration Court Proceedings, ASYLUM MANUAL (2006), 
https://immigrationequality.org/asylum/asylum-manual/immigration-court-proceedings/. 
 38. LONEGAN, supra note 34.  
 39. Immigration Equality, supra note 37.  
 40. LONEGAN, supra note 34. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 355 (1963). 
 44. Id. at 344. 
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lawyers to represent them and prepare their defense.45 Thus, because the 
laws in the United States are designed to ensure fair trials, the need for 
lawyers is essential. It is particularly fundamental for those who are 
accused of crimes and who may, as a result, be deprived of life or liberty 
to be represented by counsel.46 However, because removal and 
deportation are considered civil sanctions, as opposed to criminal, and do 
not result in incarceration as punishment, individuals in immigration 
courts do not have the Constitutional protection of the Sixth 
Amendment.47  
Nevertheless, the lack of counsel in immigration proceedings can be 
viewed through a due process lens.48 The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause states that “no person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law.”49 The Supreme Court in Mathews 
v. Eldridge clarified what due process considerations a court must 
consider in determining the adequacy of certain administrative 
procedures.50 The Supreme Court stated that in an evaluation of 
procedural due process, a court must consider three factors: (1) the private 
interests that could be affected by a governmental action; (2) the risk of 
an erroneous deprivation of those private interests and what the probative 
value of any supplemental safeguards to cure the deprivation would be; 
and (3) the government’s interest and burden in providing those possible 
safeguards.51  
Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) in 
1952.52 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1362, which is titled “Right to Counsel,” 
individuals going through a removal proceeding or any immigration 
appeal proceeding are afforded the privilege of representation by 
counsel.53 There is a circuit split as to whether a violation of Section 1362 
should allow a foreign national petitioner who was deemed removable to 
win on appeal automatically. This split has arisen because certain circuits 
have decided that the violation of the federal statute alone is not sufficient. 
Thus, unlike a criminal defendant, a petitioner in certain circuits in an 
immigration proceeding who was denied their statutory right to counsel 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. EAGLY & SHAFER, supra note 3. Importantly, immigration detention, while a form of 
incarceration, is not viewed as a form of punishment, even with its many similarities to prisons. See 
Matthew Groves, Immigration detention vs Imprisonment: Differences Explored, 29 ALTERNATIVE L.J. 
228 (2004).  
 48. Ogbemudia v. INS, 988 F.2d 595, 598 (5th Cir. 1993).  
 49. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 50. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 51. Id.    
           52.  Cohn, supra note 7. 
 53. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2020). INA § 292 was codified into U.S.C. § 1362. 
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would have to demonstrate how that denial resulted in prejudice— in 
violation of their due process right under the Fifth Amendment. 
B. Jurisdictions where Petitioners Need Not Demonstrate Prejudice 
The Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have all affirmed 
that petitioners in immigration removal proceedings who were not 
represented by counsel need not demonstrate prejudice upon appeal. 
Some of the rationales of these circuits include how the right to counsel 
in immigration proceedings is protected by statute, how a denial of 
counsel is inherently prejudicial, how immigration proceedings are 
complex and require the knowledge of counsel for legal strategy, and how 
the consequences that can arise from immigration court can be quite 
grave. This Part will address each rationale in turn. 
1. Statutory Protection 
Some of the circuits that do not require petitioners to demonstrate 
prejudice argue that because a foreign national’s right to counsel is 
statutorily protected by Section 1362, a foreign national should not need 
to demonstrate prejudice.  
i. Ninth Circuit 
In Montes-Lopes v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that the specific law that gives foreign nationals the right to be represented 
by the attorney of their choice is protected by a specific statute.54 Prior to 
the Ninth Circuit decision, the petitioner in Montes-Lopes had been 
denied a continuance in his removal hearing by the immigration judge 
because he had lied prior to the hearing.55 Specifically, the petitioner’s 
attorney did not appear at his removal hearing due to being suspended by 
the local bar; and when the immigration judge questioned the petitioner 
as to when he communicated with his attorney, the petitioner perjured 
himself.56 Thus, the immigration judge denied the petitioner a 
continuance, made the petitioner proceed with his hearing without 
counsel, and effectively had him removed.57 After the Ninth Circuit found 
that the immigration judge had not correctly applied the controlling law, 
 
 54. 694 F.3d 1085, 1092 (2012); it should be noted that the Ninth Circuit use the term “alien” 
instead of the term “foreign national.” This Note will refrain from using the term “alien,” even when it is 
used by the courts, and will instead use the term “foreign national” and other synonymous terms.  
 55. Id. at 1088. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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and because the immigration judge had violated the petitioner’s right to 
counsel as protected by Section 1362, the court determined that it had to 
remand the case in spite of any possible harmless error.58  
ii. Third Circuit 
The Third Circuit has held that if an agency has promulgated a 
regulation that protects a fundamental statutory or constitutional right, 
and one of these rights is violated by that agency, the individual affected 
by the agency’s action need not show prejudice in order to invalidate the 
action of the agency.59 When questioned about whether he was seeking 
an attorney during his removal hearing by the immigration judge, the 
petitioner in Leslie v. Attorney General of the United States stated that he 
did not have any money.60 However, the immigration judge did not 
explain that free legal services were available, and eventually ordered the 
petitioner removed.61 The Third Circuit in Leslie later affirmed that the 
statutory right to counsel for foreign nationals in removal hearings from 
Section 1362 is a derivative of the Fifth Amendment Due Process right to 
a fundamental and fair hearing.62 Thus, the right for a foreign national to 
have their choice of counsel in removal proceedings was indeed a 
fundamental right under both a federal statute and the Constitution; and if 
violated, a foreign national would not be required to demonstrate 
prejudice.63 
iii. Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Montilla v. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service insisted that agency regulations must be 
scrupulously adhered to when the rights and interests of individuals are 
regulated and controlled by the agency.64 In his initial appearance before 
the immigration judge, the petitioner in Montilla appeared without 
counsel and stated that he was unsure how he should proceed, or even if 
he should proceed, without an attorney moving forward.65 At the two 
subsequent hearing dates, the immigration judge made no notation of the 
petitioner appearing without counsel before eventually having the 
 
 58. Id. at 1092.  
 59. Leslie v. AG, 611 F.3d 171, 180 (3d Cir. 2010).  
 60. Id. at 174. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 180-81 (citing Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 408 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
 63. Id. 
 64. 926 F.2d 162, 166 (citing Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 422 
(1942)).  
 65. Id. at 164. 
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petitioner deported.66 The petitioner appealed the decision to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals before it reached the Second Circuit Court in 
Montilla.67 The Second Circuit noted that the fundamental notions of fair 
play underlying due process emphasize that agencies must abide by their 
own regulations closely or face remand, regardless of harmless error.68 
The court elected to apply this doctrine (also known as the Accardi 
doctrine), as opposed to a prejudice demonstration requirement, because 
the Accardi doctrine would allow the court to avoid deciding the case on 
constitutional grounds and would put pressure on agencies to comply with 
their own regulations.69 Thus, the Second Circuit stated that a foreign 
national need only show that the regulation that provides a right to counsel 
was not adhered to by the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(“INS”), and they need not show that the lack of counsel resulted in 
prejudice.70 
iv. Seventh Circuit 
In Castaneda-Delgado v. INS, the Seventh Circuit held that various 
sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act provide foreign nationals 
the right to counsel, and a harmless error doctrine would eviscerate that 
statutory right.71 On their initial appearance for their removal hearing, the 
petitioners in Castaneda-Delgado asked to be represented by an attorney, 
which prompted the immigration judge to issue a continuance of two 
days.72 Two days later, the petitioners appeared without an attorney again, 
stating that their attorney was unable to attend, but that they would look 
for another attorney.73 The immigration judge refused to issue another 
continuance, proceeded with the hearing without an attorney for the 
petitioners, and effectively had them deported.74 
2. Inherently Prejudicial 
Some of the circuits who do not require foreign nationals to 
demonstrate prejudice also argue that the denial of a foreign national’s 
statutory right is inherently prejudicial, and thus does not require an 
 
 66. Id. at 165. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 167.  
 69. Id. at 168-69. The Second Circuit cited to a principle of the Supreme Court that if a case can 
be decided on non-constitutional grounds, it should be. See Jean v. Nelson, 372 U.S. 846, 854 (1985).  
 70. Montilla, 926 F.2d at 169. 
 71. 525 F.2d 1295, 1302 (7th Cir. 1975). 
 72. Id. at 1298. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.  
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additional demonstration of prejudice.  
i. Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit in Castaneda-Delgado determined that a denial of 
a foreign national’s right to counsel is inherently prejudicial, so there is 
no need to demonstrate prejudice or apply the harmless error doctrine.75 
The Seventh Circuit, while citing themselves in a previous case, affirmed 
that when a defendant has their request for legal representation denied, 
the proceedings are “tainted from their roots,” leaving no room for 
calculations of prejudice that may flow from the denial of counsel.76  
ii. D.C. Circuit 
In Cheung v. INS, the D.C. Circuit affirmed that the assistance of 
counsel is so fundamental to a fair trial that lack of counsel can never be 
treated as harmless error.77 At the initial removal hearing, the petitioner 
in Cheung stated that he would proceed in his hearing without an 
attorney.78 Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit determined that even if the 
petitioner had waived his right to counsel, his waiver was undercut by the 
failure of the immigration judge to inform the petitioner of the time to 
which the petitioner was entitled to reflect on the decision.79 The court 
further stated that even if deportation is seemingly clear in a proceeding, 
an attorney can still advise their client as to where to be deported, how 
they may seek more time for a voluntary departure, how to process a claim 
for preference, how they could depart to another country to seek lawful 
entry, or even arrange interim bail.80 Therefore, even in a case where 
removal was inevitable, the presence of counsel is a fundamental right in 
immigration proceedings. 
3. Legal Strategy and Complexity 
Some of the circuits who do not require a demonstration of prejudice 
also state that legal proceedings in general, especially immigration 
proceedings, require an attorney due to their complex nature. According 
to these courts, with the assistance of counsel, foreign nationals will be 
better able to formulate legal strategies that go beyond removability. 
 
 75. Id. at 1300. (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 43 (1967)).  
 76. Id. at 1301 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 502 F.2d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 1974)).  
 77. 418 F.2d 460, 464 (D.C. 1969).  
 78. Id. at 460. 
 79. Id. at 463. 
 80. Id. at 464.  
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i. Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit claimed in Montes-Lopes that the absence of counsel 
can impact the legal decisions that are made in an immigration 
proceeding.81 Specifically, a petitioner on their own may be prevented 
from making potentially meritorious arguments, may not be able to alter 
strategic decisions during the legal process, and may not be able to limit 
the evidence that is included in the record when necessary.82  
ii. Third Circuit 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals opined in Leslie that immigration 
laws in the United States create a complex adjudication process for 
individuals to navigate.83 The intricacy of legal proceedings is often 
compounded for foreign nationals, which makes the right to counsel even 
more vital in order for one to reasonably present their case.84 
4. Severe Consequences 
Lastly, courts also emphasize that the consequences of immigration 
court, like being deported, are extremely severe and thus require the 
statutory right of counsel for foreign nationals to be protected without a 
demonstration of prejudice.  
i. Third Circuit 
In Leslie, the Third Circuit mentioned that the right to counsel is a 
procedural safeguard, given the grave consequences that can arise from a 
removal proceeding in immigration court.85 The Third Circuit articulated 
how removal predicated on an aggravated felony could result in a near-
total preclusion from returning to the United States.86 As such, removal 
can result in the deprivation of an individual to live and work in the United 
States, putting the individual’s liberty at stake.87  
 
 81. Montes-Lopes v. Holder, 694 F.3d 1085, 1092 (2012). 
 82. Id.  
 83. Leslie v. AG, 611 F.3d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 84. Id. (quoting Bernal-Vallejo v. INS, 195 F.3d 56, 63 (1st Cir. 1999)).  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)).  
 87. Id. (quoting Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 381 (3d Cir. 2003)).  
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ii. Seventh Circuit 
In Castaneda-Delgado, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted 
that in spite of a deportation hearing not being a criminal proceeding, 
proceedings in immigration court still can have serious consequences.88 
The Seventh Circuit further cited the Supreme Court, noting that 
deportation is a serious penalty, and the procedure that may lead to 
depriving a foreign national of their liberty cannot occur if it does not 
meet the standards of essential fairness.89 
C. Jurisdictions where Petitioners Must Demonstrate Prejudice 
The Fourth, Fifth, Eight, and Tenth Circuits have held that petitioners 
in immigration removal proceedings who were not represented by counsel 
must demonstrate prejudice upon appeal. Actual prejudice is defined by 
the various circuits as a defect in the deportation proceeding that “may 
well have resulted in a deportation that would not otherwise have 
occurred.”90 The rationale of these courts stems almost exclusively from 
due process concerns.   
1.  Due Process Concerns 
The main argument propounded by the courts who require a 
demonstration of prejudice is that the only recourse foreign nationals have 
is through the Due Process Clause, which partially and inherently requires 
a demonstration of prejudice. 
i. Eight Circuit 
The Eight Circuit in Njoroge v. Holder raised the issue that a violation 
of due process requires a demonstration of prejudice.91 The court 
emphasized that within the Eight Circuit,  even if it could be said that a 
foreign national’s statutory right to counsel was violated, the petitioner 
must demonstrate that the error resulted in prejudice.92 Specifically, in 
Njoroge, because neither the petitioner nor her attorney had provided 
evidence that proved that she was entitled to the relief that she sought, she 
 
 88. Castaneda-Delgago v. INS, 525 F.2d 1295, 1302 (7th Cir. 1975). 
 89. Id. (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945)).  
 90. Njoroge v. Holder, 753 F.3d 809, 812 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Torres-
Sanchez, 68 G.3d 227, 230 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. (quoting Lopez v. Heinauer, 332 F.3d 507, 512 (8th Cir. 2003)).  
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had not demonstrated prejudice.93  
ii. Fifth Circuit 
In Ogbemudia v. INS, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that to 
prevail on a claim of deprivation of counsel in immigration proceedings 
under the Fifth Amendment, the petitioner must demonstrate prejudice.94 
In Ogbemudia, the Fifth Circuit refused to find a due process violation 
because the petitioner had only contacted two attorneys, even though he 
had been given a list of attorneys to contact, and had ample time in 
detention to contact the rest of them.95 Furthermore, the petitioner had 
knowledge of deportation proceedings, had outside help available to him, 
and had been educated in the United States.96 Thus, the Fifth Circuit found 
that any failure to obtain counsel was entirely the fault of the petitioner.97 
iii. Fourth Circuit 
In Farrokhi v. INS, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a 
foreign national’s only ability to seek relief when denied their statutory 
right to counsel arises from the Fifth Amendment due process clause.98 
The Fourth Circuit identified that a foreign national’s right to counsel can 
only be challenged under the Fifth Amendment, because the statutory 
right to counsel comes at the expense of the petitioner, and not the 
government.99 Additionally, the court identified that the petitioner had 
explicitly waived his right to counsel by stating to the immigration judge 
at his hearing, “[a]t this point, I would like to speak for me[,] for 
myself.”100 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit noted that, notwithstanding 
the petitioner’s waiver, he also could not demonstrate that the lack of 
counsel resulted in any prejudice against him.101 Specifically, the 
petitioner’s non-immigrant status as a student was violated after he 
stopped attending school. The court therefore held that presence of 
counsel could not have changed that outcome, which meant that the 
petitioner was not prejudiced.102  
 
 93. Id. at 813. 
 94. 988 F.2d 595, 598 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. 900 F.2d 697, 701 (4th Cir. 1990).  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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iv. Tenth Circuit 
In Michaelson v. INS, the Tenth Circuit identified due process 
concerns, but explicitly stated that due process does not automatically 
equate to a right to counsel in immigration proceedings.103 Thus, the 
petitioner would need to demonstrate prejudice in order to cast doubt on 
the fairness of the removal proceeding.104 
III. DISCUSSION 
This Section will discuss why foreign nationals should not be required 
to demonstrate prejudice if they are denied their right to counsel in 
immigration proceedings. Part A will begin by discussing how the circuits 
who require a demonstration of prejudice incorrectly liken an inevitable 
outcome for a foreign national with prejudice or harmless error. Part B 
will outline how those same circuits who require a demonstration of 
prejudice ignore the burden on the government that needs to be analyzed 
when considering whether an individual’s due process right was violated. 
Part C will highlight the double standard that exists for foreign nationals 
in immigration court, as compared to criminal defendants. Further, Part C 
will argue that foreign nationals should be provided counsel at the 
government’s expense, making the need for a foreign national to 
demonstrate prejudice wholly irrelevant.  
A. Equating Prejudice or Harmless Error with Inevitable Outcome 
The Fourth, Fifth, Eight, and Tenth Circuits have all determined that 
the petitioners who appeared in front of them on appeal could not 
demonstrate how a statutory denial of counsel in their removal proceeding 
led to prejudice. Specifically, the aforementioned circuits pointed out that 
the respective petitioners were inevitably going to be deported, and that 
having counsel would not have changed that outcome. However, equating 
an inevitable deportation with prejudice or harmless error is a 
mischaracterization.  
Although deportation may well have occurred with or without the 
presence of counsel, the circuits who require prejudice fail to recognize 
that a removal proceeding is not exclusively about deportation. In fact, 
from the time a foreign national may have been detained until their 
official court appearance, there are many notable instances where having 
an attorney is vital and necessary.  
If a foreign national is put in jail for a criminal offense, an ICE agent 
 
 103. 897 F.2d 465, 467 (10th Cir. 1990).  
 104. Id. 
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is allowed to interview the foreign national about their immigration 
status.105 A prosecutor could, in theory, question a foreign national in jail, 
and they would have a right to an attorney at the government’s expense 
as protected by the Sixth Amendment. However, there would be no 
equivalent protection when being interviewed by an ICE agent. 
Furthermore, under federal law, after a foreign national has served their 
time in jail, ICE is only able to detain that foreign national in ICE custody 
for forty-eight hours.106 If ICE holds a foreign national for longer, without 
an attorney, they would have no way of knowing that they were being 
held for an impermissible length of time, and would also not know how 
to file a writ of habeas corpus and demand release.107  
ICE also has adopted thirty-eight standards for what the immigration 
detention system is supposed to provide to detainees.108 These standards 
include funds and personal property, space for religious practices, food 
services, and personal hygiene products, to name just a few.109 When a 
standard has been violated, a grievance must be filed within five days of 
the event.110 However, a foreign national (particularly one who does not 
speak English) may have no way of knowing how to file a grievance, or 
even if a standard was violated, without the help of counsel. Some foreign 
nationals may be eligible for release from detention on bond as well, 
which would require the need to set up and prepare for a bond hearing—
another process which has no Sixth Amendment protection.111 
Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit in Cheung stated that an attorney could 
still advise a foreign national subject to removal as to where to be 
deported, how to seek more time for a voluntary departure, how to process 
a claim for preference, how to depart to another country to seek lawful 
entry, or even arrange interim bail, which are all distinct benefits of legal 
representation, even if deportation is seemingly clear.112 Thus, the 
inevitability of deportation despite a lack of counsel should not be the sole 
measure of whether a foreign national faced prejudice.  
There are many steps and procedures amidst a full removal process, 
beyond deportation, many of which need the assistance of counsel. From 
an immigration judges’ perspective, ignoring the multitude of options that 
may exist for a foreign national through an immigration process, even if 
 
 105. Lonegan, supra note 34. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS FOR 
NON-DEDICATED FACILITIES (2019), available athttps://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-
standards/2019/nds2019.pdf. 
 110. Lonegan, supra note 34. 
 111. Id.  
 112. Cheung v. INS, 418 F.2d 460, 464 (D.C. 1969). 
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deportation is inevitable, is prejudicial. The exclusive focus on inevitable 
deportation by some of the circuits is misguided, considering the many 
other steps within an immigration process where a foreign national could 
be prejudiced. Ultimately, a foreign national’s only ability to seek such 
recourse, or any recourse at all, is with the assistance of counsel.  
B. Ignoring the Government’s Burden 
As mentioned, some of the circuits discuss how a foreign national’s 
ability to seek retribution for being denied their statutory right to counsel 
exists exclusively under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. Thus, 
according to some circuits, a foreign national must demonstrate that they 
were prejudiced by denial of their right to counsel. Critically, however, 
these circuits fail to consider the third factor of the Mathews due process 
test upon which they rely: what the government’s interest and burden is 
in providing possible safeguards for the erroneous deprivation of a private 
interest by governmental action. 113 
The Eight Circuit in Njoroge stated that in order for there to be a due 
process violation, a foreign national “must demonstrate both a 
fundamental procedural error and that the error resulted in prejudice.”114 
The Fifth Circuit in Ogbemudia stated that in order for there to be a due 
process violation, the violation must “impinge upon the fundamental 
fairness of the hearing in violation of the fifth amendment,” and there 
must be substantial prejudice.115 Additionally, the Tenth Circuit in 
Michelson mentioned that a petitioner must demonstrate prejudice that 
implicates the fundamental fairness of the proceeding in order for a due 
process violation to be found.116 However, the Eight, Fifth and Tenth 
Circuits fail to mention how the determination of a due process violation 
under Mathews v. Eldrige also requires analyzing the burden of the 
government as the third factor. It should be noted that the Fourth Circuit 
in Farokhi stated that because neither party provided any data describing 
what the government’s burden would be and because the procedure in 
place amply protected the petitioner to begin with, the court did not need 
to consider the last factor of the Due Process Analysis.117  
It is also not unduly burdensome for governments and immigration 
judges to provide a possible safeguard for foreign nationals. Mathews 
 
 113. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 114. Njoroge v. Holder, 753 F.3d 809, 812 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 
461, 464 (8th Cir. 2004)). 
 115. Ogbemudia v. INS, 988 F.2d 595, 598 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Paul v. U.S. Immigration & 
Naturalization, 521 F.2d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 116. Michelson v. INS, 897 F.2d 465, 468 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 117. Farrokhi v. INS, 900 F.2d 697, 703 n.6 (4th Cir. 1990). The purported burden of the 
government would have been to providing instructions for applying for asylum in writing.  
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discusses, in part, that the probable additional financial cost and 
administrative burden must be considered in analyzing a due process 
claim.118 Here, it is not likely that it would be an additional financial 
burden for immigration judges to simply comply with the statutorily 
protected right to counsel for foreign nationals. More importantly, unlike 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which provides criminal 
defendants the right to counsel at the government’s expense, the statutory 
right to counsel for foreign nationals in removal proceedings under 8 
U.S.C. § 1362 is only at the foreign national’s expense.119 So while there 
is a financial burden to provide counsel to criminal defendants, in order 
to comply with Section 1362, immigration judges need only provide a list 
of free and low-cost counsel options for foreign nationals, how they can 
be in contact with them, and possibly a continuance to seek out counsel if 
necessary prior to one’s hearing—an almost negligible and nominal 
government cost.120  
In spite of the circuit split concerning whether a foreign national needs 
to demonstrate prejudice when they are denied their statutory rights, an 
admission that the statutory right can be provided at a negligible 
government cost makes the prejudice argument a moot point. To reiterate, 
the Supreme Court in Mathews notes that a Due Process Analysis requires 
the evaluation of not just private interests and how a deprivation of the 
private interest resulted in prejudice, but also the government’s burden in 
curing that deprivation. Unfortunately, the circuits who require a 
demonstration of prejudice fail to even mention, let alone analyze, the 
critical third factor of Mathews. This is particularly unfortunate, since the 
government has next to no burden in satisfying a foreign national’s 
statutory right under Section 1362, given that the true cost of obtaining 
counsel is on the foreign national to begin with. Whether a foreign 
national was potentially prejudiced in their removal proceeding is 
inconsequential when all an immigration judge needed to do was provide 
a foreign national with a list of resources that could have effectively 
avoided all the litigation that is covered by the circuits discussed in this 
Note.  
C. The Double Standard Between Criminal Defendants and Foreign 
Nationals 
A criminal defendant going through a criminal proceeding 
unquestionably faces severe consequences. This is ostensibly why there 
is an enormous burden for the government to overcome before depriving 
 
 118. Id. at 347. 
 119. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2020). 
 120. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2020). 
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someone of their life or liberty in a criminal proceeding. Without 
minimizing the consequences suffered by criminal defendants, foreign 
nationals in removal proceedings often have equally severe consequences 
in their legal battle. Although this Note concerns whether foreign 
nationals need to demonstrate prejudice if they are denied a statutory right 
to counsel, it should be noted that foreign nationals should unquestionably 
have a right to counsel, at the government’s expense, akin to that of 
criminal defendants.  
Some of the aforementioned circuits contend and acknowledge how the 
very severe and real consequences of a removal proceeding should 
provide a procedural safeguard for foreign nationals.121 The consequence 
of being deported, and perhaps even uprooted from the United States, is 
a harsh consequence, and to insist that it is still a civil charge that requires 
fewer procedural safeguards than a criminal charge is a legal fiction.  
Even if one were to say that incarceration as the punishment is what 
truly distinguishes foreign nationals and other civil cases from criminal 
defendants and criminal cases would also be arguing an incorrect 
distinction. For example, civil contempt cases, which concern an 
individual failing to satisfy a court order, can also lead to incarceration in 
a civil context.122 Regardless, the Supreme Court in Turner v. Rogers held 
that even for individuals who are facing civil contempt charges, where 
incarceration is a possible consequence, the Constitution does not 
automatically provide a right to counsel as it does in criminal 
proceedings.123 
Nevertheless, the current rhetoric surrounding immigrants and foreign 
nationals, some of which was perpetuated by former President Trump, 
would lead one to think that foreign nationals who are allegedly within 
the United States improperly are indeed “criminals.” In addition to 
referring to undocumented Mexican immigrants as “rapists” and 
“criminals” at rallies and public speeches without any empirical data to 
support that assertion, Trump posted a slew of tweets on Twitter that 
emphasize an anti-immigrant rhetoric and a need to keep “illegal 
immigrants” out of the United States.124 Trump also reportedly referred 
 
 121. See Leslie v. AG, 611 F.3d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 2010) and Castaneda-Delgago v. INS, 525 F.2d 
1295, 1302 (7th Cir. 1975). 
 122. Cornell Law School, Contempt of Court, Civil, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/contempt_of_court_civil (last visited Apr. 4, 2021).  
 123. Turner v. Rogers was concerning a petitioner who was held in contempt after failing to make 
child support payments and was sentenced to a 90-day imprisonment. Although the Supreme Court held 
that the petitioner was not entitled to counsel, the Court also found that petitioner’s incarceration violated 
the Due Process clause on other grounds. 564 U.S. 431, 449 (2011).  
 124. Emily Dai, How Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric Shapes the Supreme Court, WASH. SQUARE NEWS 
(Apr. 28, 2020), https://nyunews.com/opinion/2020/04/28/supreme-court-anti-immigrant/. See also 
Brenna Williams, Trump’s immigrant policy (or what we know about it) in 13 illuminating tweets, CNN 
(Aug. 26, 2016, 7:18 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/26/politics/donald-trump-immigration-
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to Haiti and various African nations as “shithole countries,” while also 
tweeting at Representatives Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Ilhan Omar, 
Rashida Tlaib, and Ayanna Pressley to “go back” to the “places from 
which they came.”125 In spite of a societal view of criminals as inferior, 
criminals are still given extraordinary constitutional protections. Yet, 
foreign nationals, who Trump and others may view as “criminals,” do not 
get the same luxury. 
In citing back to Justice Black’s “obvious truth,” a criminal defendant 
who cannot hire an attorney on their own would be subjected to an unfair 
trial if the government does not provide an attorney themselves. 
Ostensibly, the Supreme Court in Gideon felt a desire to level the 
proverbial playing field for indigent defendants who would have no 
chance of defending themselves against a seasoned prosecutor. And yet, 
there is seemingly no rush or pressure to level the playing field for 
“criminal” foreign nationals, some of whom who may speak English as a 
second language or who may not speak English at all.126 In fact, the 
question of a right to counsel is not even a discussion of merit in some 
jurisdictions where foreign nationals instead have the burden of 
demonstrating that they were prejudiced in a game where the odds were 
never in their favor to begin with. Apparently, Justice Black’s “obvious 
truth” is too precious for those not born in the United States.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
provides all criminal defendants with the right to an attorney at the 
government’s expense if the defendant is not able to afford one. However, 
foreign nationals who face the threat of removal from the United States 
do not have a similar Constitutional protection. Instead, foreign nationals 
have a right to an attorney that is instead protected by federal statute (as 
opposed to the Constitution) and is also at the expense of the foreign 
national (as opposed to being free of charge). This distinction is important 
 
tweets/index.html.  
 125. Vitali et. al, Trump referred to Haiti and African nations as ‘shithole’ countries, NBC NEWS 
(Jan. 11, 2018, 5:19 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-referred-haiti-african-
countries-shithole-nations-n836946. It should be noted that Representatives Ocasio-Cortez, Omar, Tlaib, 
and Pressley are all women of color. Furthermore, Representative Omar is the only one of the four born 
outside of the United States, namely in Somalia, while the other three are natural-born United States 
citizens. Representative Omar eventually became a United States citizen herself in 2000. Brian Taylor, 
Lawmakers Respond to Trump’s Racist Comments: We Are Here To Stay, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 15, 
2019, 11:03 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/15/741771445/trump-continues-twitter-assault-on-4-
minority-congresswomen.  
 126. Some of the petitioners at issue in this Note are mentioned as either speaking English as a 
second language or not being able to speak English at all. See Castenada-Delgado v. INS, 525 F.2d 1295, 
1296 (7th Cir. 1975) and Cheung v. INS, 418 F.2d 460, 461 (D.C. 1969). 
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because certain circuits have determined that a mere violation of the 
federal statute may not on its own provide foreign nationals with recourse 
if that statutory right is denied.  
Thus, the question exists as to whether a foreign national who is denied 
their statutory right to counsel only has recourse through the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause. For circuits who believe that is the case, 
foreign nationals must demonstrate how a denial of counsel resulted in 
prejudice that violated their due process rights under the Fifth 
Amendment. Conversely, other circuits rationalize that prejudice does not 
need to be demonstrated because the right to counsel in immigration 
proceedings is protected by statute, a denial of counsel is inherently 
prejudicial, immigration proceedings are complex and require the 
knowledge of counsel for legal strategy, and the consequences that can 
arise from immigration court can be quite severe.   
Ultimately, foreign nationals who are denied their statutory right to 
counsel should not need to demonstrate prejudice. Circuits that require a 
demonstration of prejudice incorrectly liken an inevitable outcome for a 
foreign national with prejudice or harmless error. Furthermore, a true due 
process analysis requires considering the burden of the government which 
is minimal when it comes to the statutory right foreign nationals have. If 
anything, foreign nationals should be protected in the same Constitutional 
fashion as criminal defendants when it comes to a right to counsel. 
Although the right to counsel in immigration proceedings may not be a 
mandatory right under the Constitution, to require foreign nationals to 
separately demonstrate prejudice runs contrary to the fundamental aims 
of the American legal system. As foreign nationals are already 
delegitimized, marginalized, and oppressed by that legal system, a denial 
of a right to counsel is unconscionable.  
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